
Fundamentals for Newer Directors 2014 (pdf)
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July 13, 2023
TO: ICI Members
On July 12, 2023, the Securities and Exchange Commission, in a 3-2 party-line vote, adopted amendments to Rule 2a-7 and certain other rules that govern money market funds under the Investment Company Act of 1940.[1] According to the SEC's adopting release (Release), the amendments are "designed to improve the resilience and transparency of money market funds" following the liquidity stresses experienced in March 2020 in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated stresses in the short-term funding markets. Among other things, the final rule amendments:
Each of these amendments and their compliance dates are described below.
Rule 2a-7 currently provides that a money market fund may impose a liquidity fee of up to 2 percent, or temporarily suspend redemptions (i.e., impose a "gate"), if the fund's weekly liquid assets fall below 30 percent of its total assets and the fund's board of directors determines that imposing a fee or gate is in the fund's best interests. The rule also includes a default liquidity fee if a fund's weekly liquid assets fall below 10 percent, unless the board determines that a fee would not be in the best interests of the fund.
The Release acknowledges that in March 2020, even though no money market fund imposed a fee or gate, the possibility of their imposition appears to have contributed to investors' incentives to redeem from prime money market funds and for fund managers to maintain weekly liquid asset levels above the threshold, rather than use those assets to meet redemptions. The Release states that these tools therefore appear to have potentially increased the risks of investor runs without providing benefits to money market funds as intended. The SEC's analysis and external research are consistent with commenters' views (including ICI) on investor behavior and found that prime and tax-exempt money market funds whose weekly liquid assets approached the 30 percent threshold had, on average, larger outflows in percentage terms than other prime and tax-exempt money market funds. As a result, the SEC approved amendments, as proposed, to remove the tie between liquidity thresholds and fee and gate provisions, and moreover, to remove the gate provisions from Rule 2a-7 entirely. Under the final rule amendments, a money market fund would continue to be able to suspend redemptions to facilitate an orderly liquidation of the fund under Rule 22e-3 (consistent with ICI's recommendation).
The SEC had proposed a swing pricing requirement specifically for institutional prime and institutional tax-exempt money market funds that would apply when the fund experiences net redemptions (not net subscriptions). The Release noted that "[m]any commenters … expressed concern about the consequences of the proposed swing pricing requirement, suggesting, among other reasons, that it would be operationally difficult and may not effectively prevent destabilizing runs during periods of stress." The SEC declined to adopt the proposed swing pricing requirement. Rather, the final amendments modify the current liquidity fee framework to require institutional prime and institutional tax-exempt money market funds to impose a liquidity fee when the fund experiences net redemptions that exceed 5% of net assets, while also allowing any non-government money market fund to impose a discretionary liquidity fee if the board determines a fee is in the best interest of the fund (discussed in greater detail below). The Release noted that "swing pricing and liquidity fees can be economically equivalent in terms of charging redeeming investors for the liquidity costs they impose on a fund," and that "[b]oth approaches allow funds to recapture the liquidity costs of redemptions to make non-redeeming investors whole."
The Release discusses at length commenters' views on the proposed swing pricing requirement, and following consideration of these comments, the Commission determined to adopt "a liquidity fee framework to better allocate liquidity costs to redeeming investors." According to the Release, the proposed swing pricing requirement was "designed to address potential shareholder dilution and the potential for a first-mover advantage for institutional funds." The Release stated that while the Commission continues "to believe these goals are important, [it is] persuaded by commenters that these same goals are better achieved through a liquidity fee mechanism, particularly given that current rule 2a-7 includes a liquidity fee framework that funds are accustomed to and can build upon."
The final rule amendments adopt a mandatory liquidity fee framework for institutional prime and institutional tax-exempt funds instead of the proposed swing pricing requirement, "to better allocate liquidity costs to redeeming investors." Additionally, the final rule amendments adopt a discretionary liquidity fee for all non-government money market funds "so that liquidity fees are an available tool for such funds to manage redemption pressures when the mandatory fee does not apply."
Pursuant to the final rule amendments, institutional prime and institutional tax-exempt money market funds will be required to impose a mandatory liquidity fee on redeeming investors when daily net redemptions exceed 5% of net assets. Funds will not be required to impose this fee, however, when liquidity costs are less than one basis point, which the Commission anticipates "will often be the case under normal market conditions."
The mandatory liquidity fee approach will "require redeeming investors to pay the cost of depleting a fund's liquidity, particularly under stressed market conditions and when net redemptions are sizeable." The Release notes that there can be "significant, unfair adverse consequences to remaining investors in a fund in [times of market stress], including material dilution of remaining investors' interests in the fund," and "the mandatory liquidity fee mechanism is designed to reduce the potential for such dilution." The Commission states its view that "redeeming investors should bear liquidity costs associated with sizeable redemption activity" and describes the liquidity fee requirement as being "designed to protect remaining shareholders from dilution under these circumstances and to more fairly allocate costs so that redeeming shareholders bear the costs of removing liquidity from the fund when liquidity in underlying short-term funding markets is costly." The Release asserts that "to the extent that investors currently are incentivized to redeem quickly during periods of market stress to avoid potential costs from a fund's future sale of less liquid securities, the amendments will reduce those first-mover incentives and the associated run risk." In support of the 5% threshold for net redemptions, the Release states that "the 5% net redemption threshold is designed to help mitigate the risk that a significant amount of redemptions could occur under stressed market conditions before a fee is triggered, thus incentivizing investors to redeem ahead of others."
Overview of the Mandatory Liquidity Fee
Overview of the Discretionary Liquidity Fee
Terms of the Mandatory Liquidity Fee Requirement. The fee amount would reflect the fund's good faith estimate of liquidity costs, supported by data, of the costs the fund would incur if it sold a pro rata amount of each security in its portfolio (i.e., vertical slice) to satisfy the amount of net redemptions, including: (1) spread costs and any other charges, fees, and taxes associated with portfolio security sales; and (2) market impacts for each security.
The new mandatory liquidity fee has some key differences as compared to the current rule. For example, the mandatory liquidity fee is triggered by net redemptions as opposed to weekly liquid assets. In addition, unlike the current rule, the amended framework does not provide discretion to the board with respect to its application. The new mandatory liquidity fee only applies to institutional prime and institutional tax-exempt funds. This is in contrast to the current rule's default liquidity fees, which apply to retail funds. The final rule amendments do not require retail or government money market funds to implement mandatory liquidity fees due to "differences in investor behavior and, in the case of government funds, liquidity costs." The mandatory liquidity fee applies to all institutional funds, irrespective of whether they are offered publicly. The Commission declined to provide an exception for these funds from the mandatory liquidity fee requirement because it does "not believe that such funds are immune to the risks of dilution and potential first-mover advantages that mandatory liquidity fees are designed to address."
Threshold for Mandatory Liquidity Fees. An institutional prime or institutional tax-exempt money market fund must apply a liquidity fee if its total daily net redemptions exceed 5% of the fund's net asset value based on flow information available within a reasonable period after the last computation of the fund's net asset value on that day. If this threshold is crossed, the fund must apply a liquidity fee to all shares that are redeemed at a price computed on that day. The final rule also permits a fund to use a lower net redemption threshold than is required. When the 5% net redemption threshold is crossed, the fee must be applied to all shares redeemed that day, including redemptions that are eligible to receive a NAV computed on that day even if received by the fund after the last pricing period of the day. According to the Release, this "approach will require redeeming investors who cause the fund to exceed the threshold to bear the costs of their redemption activity, irrespective of when they redeem during the day." With respect to the application of a fee to an investor who has both redeemed and purchased the fund's shares on the relevant day, the final rule would permit funds to apply liquidity fees based on an investor's net transaction activity for that day.
Administration of Mandatory Liquidity Fees. Under the final rule, an institutional fund's board will be responsible for administering the mandatory liquidity fee, but the board can delegate this responsibility to the fund's investment adviser or officers, subject to written guidelines established and reviewed by the board and ongoing board oversight. Under the final rule's delegation provision, a board will need to adopt and periodically review written guidelines (including guidelines for determining the application and size of liquidity fees) and procedures under which a delegate makes liquidity fee determinations. Such written guidelines generally should specify the manner in which the delegate is to act with respect to any discretionary aspect of the liquidity fee mechanism (e.g., whether the fund will apply a fee to a shareholder based on the shareholder's gross or net redemption activity for the relevant day, the fund's approach to determining the reasonable period after the last pricing period of the day when the delegate will measure the fund's flows for purposes of the 5% net redemption threshold). The board will also need to periodically review the delegate's liquidity fee determinations.
Calculation and Size of Mandatory Liquidity Fees. The mandatory liquidity fee provision generally will require an institutional fund to determine the amount to charge redeeming investors by making a good faith estimate, supported by data, of the costs the fund would incur if it sold a pro rata amount of each security in its portfolio (i.e., "vertical slice") to satisfy the amount of net redemptions, including spread costs, such that the fund is valuing each security at its bid price and any other charges, fees, and taxes associated with portfolio security sales ("transaction costs") and market impacts. The final rule provides that if an institutional fund makes a good faith estimate that liquidity costs are de minimis, then the fund is not required to charge a liquidity fee. In addition, if a fund cannot estimate in good faith the costs of selling a pro rata amount of each portfolio security, then the fund will apply a default fee of 1% of the value of the shares redeemed.
The fee has two components: (1) transaction costs; and (2) market impact costs. The transaction costs category includes spread costs, such that the fund is valuing each security at its bid price, and any other charges, fees, and taxes associated with portfolio security sales. The Release recognizes that "most funds will not have to include spread costs in their charged liquidity fee because they already use bid pricing." However, funds that do not currently use bid pricing will need to include spread costs in the fee. According to the Release, the required market impact calculation is designed to provide a good faith estimate of the full liquidity costs of selling a vertical slice of a money market fund's portfolio because, for a money market fund's less liquid investments, market impacts may impose significant costs on a fund that should be borne by redeeming investors as opposed to remaining investors. Mechanically, a fund would first establish a market impact factor for each security, which is a good faith estimate of the percentage change in the value of the security if it were sold, per dollar of the amount of the security that would be sold, if the fund sold a pro rata amount of each security in its portfolio to satisfy the amount of net redemptions, under current market conditions. A fund would then multiply the market impact factor by the dollar amount of the security that would be sold.
The Commission recognizes that "the calculated liquidity fee will be based on good faith estimates and thus will not precisely reflect the liquidity costs of redemptions" while noting that "this result is preferable to an overly low liquidity fee that does not attempt to include market impact costs, which can be a significant source of liquidity costs." The Release suggest that, in order to "develop good faith estimates of market impact costs supported by data, funds may consider using historical data to model the reasonably expected price concessions a fund may need to make to sell different amounts of a security under different market conditions." Specifically, among other potential methods for establishing a good faith estimate of the market impact of selling a vertical slice of the fund's portfolio to meet net redemptions, the Commission suggested that "a fund could estimate and document in pricing grids the effect of selling different amounts of the security on a security's price for each group of securities in its portfolio with the same or substantially similar characteristics under different market conditions, and that "[u]nder a grid-based approach, a fund would develop separate grids for different market conditions, such as normal market conditions or periods with credit stress, liquidity stress, or interest rate stress (or a combination of such stresses)."
After estimating the transaction costs and market impact costs of selling a vertical slice of the fund's portfolio to meet net redemptions, the fund will need to determine the liquidity fee amount, as a percentage of the value of the shares redeemed, to fairly allocate these costs across all redemptions. To do so, a fund will need information about gross redemptions from each intermediary for that day. After acknowledging that "some intermediaries may currently provide only net flow information to funds," the Commission observes that "funds may need to update their arrangements with intermediaries to obtain the gross amount of redemptions in a timely manner."
In response to commenters' concerns about the ability of funds to make good faith estimates of the market impact of selling a vertical slice of the fund's portfolio in periods of market stress, particularly when the markets for portfolio securities are frozen, the final rule provides that a fund must impose a default liquidity fee of 1% if the fund is not able to make a good faith estimate of its liquidity costs. The Release notes that "funds will use the default fee when they cannot estimate transaction and market impact costs in good faith, and supported by data." The Commission has also amended its "recordkeeping rules to require funds to retain records that document how they determine the amount of any liquidity fee." If a fund establishes good faith estimates of its liquidity costs by using pricing grids or otherwise, it must preserve records supporting each fee computation. If the fund applies a 1% default liquidity fee, the fund must preserve records supporting its determination that it cannot establish a good faith estimate of its liquidity costs. If a fund determines that its liquidity costs are less than 0.01% of the value of the shares redeemed and therefore the fund is not required to apply a liquidity fee under the rule, the fund must preserve records supporting how it determined that the costs would be less than 0.01%.
The mandatory liquidity fee will not be capped since it is reflective of a fund's estimated liquidity costs. This is a change as compared to the current rule, which does not allow a fee to exceed 2% of the value of the shares redeemed.
The Continued Availability of Discretionary Liquidity Fees. The final rule amendments largely retain the discretionary liquidity fee provisions in current rule 2a-7, but without the tie between liquidity fees and weekly liquid assets, as the Commission "recognize[s] that a discretionary liquidity fee provides money market fund boards with an additional tool to manage liquidity, particularly in times of stress." Under the amended rule, irrespective of weekly liquid asset levels (or redemption levels), a non-government money market fund will apply a discretionary fee if the board (or its delegate) determines that such fee is in the best interests of the fund. The final rule amendments provide for a "2% upper limit" which "will provide fund boards (or their delegates) with greater flexibility to impose a fee that is based on liquidity costs in times of stress than a lower limit."
The final rule amendments adopt, as proposed, the requirements that a money market fund, immediately after acquisition of an asset, hold at least 25% of its total assets in daily liquid assets and at least 50% of its total assets in weekly liquid assets. Despite noting that "[c]ommenters expressed that a more modest increase to the liquidity requirements would be more appropriate given that the amendments to the current liquidity fee and redemption gate framework would allow money market funds to use existing liquid assets more freely to meet redemptions," the Commission's "analysis suggests that 25% daily liquid assets and 50% weekly liquid assets paired with [the] other amendments would be sufficient to allow most money market funds to manage their liquidity risk in a market crisis, while lower minimum levels of liquidity may not provide an adequate buffer during a market crisis."
With the exception of tax-exempt money market funds, which will continue to be exempt from the daily liquid asset requirements, the amendments do not establish different liquidity thresholds by type of fund.
Compliance with the minimum liquidity requirements will continue to be determined at security acquisition. As proposed, the amendments to rule 2a-7 maintain the current approach and require that a fund that falls below 25% daily liquid assets or 50% weekly liquid assets may not acquire any assets other than daily liquid assets or weekly liquid assets, respectively, until it meets these minimum thresholds. As proposed, the amendments, however, will require a fund to notify its board of directors when the fund's liquidity falls to less than half of the required levels, that is, when the fund has invested less than 25% of its total assets in weekly liquid assets or less than 12.5% of its total assets in daily liquid assets (a "liquidity threshold event"). A fund must notify the board within one business day of the liquidity threshold event and must provide the board with a brief description of the facts and circumstances that led to the liquidity threshold event within four business days after its occurrence.
As proposed, the Commission adopted amendments to the liquidity metrics in the rule's stress testing requirements to reflect amendments to the liquidity fee framework and the increase of regulatory liquidity minimums. Each fund will be required to determine the minimum level of liquidity it seeks to maintain during stress periods, identify that liquidity level in its written stress testing procedures, periodically test its ability to maintain such liquidity, and provide the fund's board with a report on the results of the testing.
Rule 2a-7, in its current form, does not explicitly address how money market funds must operate when interest rates are negative. The Commission noted its continued belief that "a scenario in which a fund has negative gross yield as a result of negative interest rates could lead a fund to convert to a floating share price, as the current rule already permits." However, in a change from the proposal, the final rule will also permit a stable NAV fund to reduce the number of its shares outstanding to maintain a stable NAV per share in the event of negative interest rates, subject to certain board determinations and disclosures to investors. Under the final rule, a stable NAV fund will be permitted to either convert to a floating NAV or to engage in share cancellation in this scenario. Should a negative interest rate scenario ever occur in future periods and cause a stable NAV fund to have negative gross yield, a stable NAV fund will have the flexibility under the final rule to use a floating NAV, as already permitted, or to use a reverse distribution mechanism (RDM) if the board determines that cancelling shares is in the best interests of the fund and its shareholders and the fund provides appropriate disclosure to mitigate the possibility of investor confusion. In addressing the tax treatment of such a scenario, the Release cautioned that "[t]here is no certainty either that the Treasury Department and the IRS will issue guidance to remove any tax challenges to the use of RDM share cancellation or that Congress will enact legislation to do so."
The Commission had proposed to require stable NAV funds to determine that each financial intermediary in the fund's distribution network has the capacity to redeem and sell the fund's shares at non-stable prices or, if this determination cannot be made, to prohibit the relevant intermediary from purchasing the fund's shares in nominee name. The Release noted that "[a]fter considering comments, and given that [the Commission is] permitting a stable NAV fund to use RDM under specified conditions in the final rule, [the Commission is] not adopting this aspect of the proposal." The Release indicated the Commission's belief that "stable NAV money market funds generally should engage with their distribution network in considering how they would handle a negative interest rate environment, as intermediaries' abilities to move to a four-digit NAV and apply a floating NAV or to process share cancellations is an important consideration in determining an approach that is in the best interests of the fund and its shareholders," and that "it is important for a stable NAV money market fund to understand the capabilities of its distribution network in the event the fund breaks the buck."
The final rule adopts amendments, as proposed, to rule 2a-7 to specify the calculations of dollar-weighted average portfolio maturity (WAM) and dollar-weighted average life maturity (WAL). Under the amended definitions of WAM and WAL, funds will be required to calculate WAM and WAL based on the percentage of each security's market value in the portfolio.
Amendments to Form N-CR
Amendments to Form N-MFP
Amendments to Form PF. Form PF amendments apply only to large liquidity fund advisers, which generally are SEC-registered investment advisers that advise at least one liquidity fund and manage, collectively with their related persons, at least $1 billion in combined liquidity fund and money market fund assets.
Form N-CSR. The final rule contains an amendment to Form N-CSR to retain an exception addressing money market funds' financial statements that was "inadvertently omitted as a result of amendments adopted in the Tailored Shareholder Reports Adopting Release."
Form N-1A. The final rule contains amendments to Item 27A(i) of Form N-1A and the corresponding instructions to "correct an error resulting from the Commission's 2022 rulemaking on enhanced reporting of proxy votes by registered management investment companies."
Joshua Weinberg
Associate General Counsel, Securities Regulation
[1] See Money Market Fund Reforms; Form PF Reporting Requirements for Large Liquidity Fund Advisers; Technical Amendments to Form N-CSR and Form N-1A, Release Nos. 33-11211; 34-97876; IA-6344; IC-34959 (July 12, 2023), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2023/33-11211.pdf.
ICI's summary memo of the SEC's Money Market Fund Reform Proposal can be found at https://www.ici.org/memo33971.
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