Memo #
1309

BILL ON TAKEOVER REFORM/PROXY VOTING INTRODUCED

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August 1, 1989 TO: SEC RULES COMMITTEE NO. 45-89 UNIT INVESTMENT TRUST COMMITTEE NO. 43-89 CLOSED-END FUND COMMITTEE NO. 31-89 INVESTMENT ADVISERS COMMITTEE NO. 30-89 RE: BILL ON TAKEOVER REFORM/PROXY VOTING INTRODUCED __________________________________________________________ S. 1244, the "Corporate Takeover Reform Act of 1989", has been introduced by Senators Metzenbaum and Armstrong. Many of the bill's provisions have been introduced before or are based on provisions in prior bills. However, the provision relating to confidential proxy voting is new. The bill and the floor statements of its sponsors are attached. A summary of the provisions of the bill is set forth below. Change of Exchange Act Section 13(d) Threshold and 10-day Window Securities Exchange Act Section 13(d) requires persons who acquire, directly or indirectly, more than five percent of the shares of any class of most equity securities to notify the issuer of the security, the exchanges upon which the security is traded and the Commission of the acquisition and certain additional information. S. 1244 would require a person to notify the issuer, the exchanges and the Commission within one day if the person acquires more than four percent of a class. Waiting Period S. 1244 would amend Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act to require most tender offers to be open for 60 days. Certain issuer tender offers would not be subject to the 60 day requirement. Provisions Applicable to Certain Issuers The following provisions would apply to issuers of securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act, insurance companies which issue equity securities that would be required to be so registered except for the exemption contained in Section 12(g)(2)(G) and closed-end investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act. a. Greenmail Enactment of the bill would prevent such issuers from acquiring the securities of any person who holds more than 3 percent of a class of their securities unless the acquisition is approved by a shareholder vote or the acquisition is as a result of a tender offer to all of the holders of that class. b. Poison Pills Enactment of the bill would prevent such issuers from granting rights to any securityholders that are contingent upon the acquisition of securities of the issuer by a person other than the issuer unless the granting of the rights has been approved by a shareholder vote. Moreover, such rights that have already been granted would have to be submitted to shareholders for ratification within three years of enactment of the bill. c. Golden Parachutes Enactment of the bill would prevent such issuers from entering into agreements to increase the compensation of any officer or director upon change of control of the issuer in an amount that would constitute an "excess parachute payment" without a shareholder vote. Moreover, such agreements into which a company has already entered would have to be submitted to shareholders for ratification within three years of the enactment of the bill. The term "excess parachute payment" is defined in Section 280G(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code. Confidential Proxy Voting If S. 1244 were enacted the Securities and Exchange commission would be required to adopt rules within 11 months to a year of the bill's enactment to require tabulation of proxies by independent third parties and to otherwise ensure the integrity and fairness of the proxy voting process. Unless the Commission were able to devise other methods to protect the process, it would have to adopt rules requiring confidentiality in the granting and voting of proxies. Increased Access to Proxy Statements for Shareholders The bill would also require issuers to include in proxy statements proposals, and descriptions and statements relating to such proposals or proposals of the issuer, from shareholders representing 3 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the issuer. Damages for Securities Fraud Finally, the bill would provide that a person could recover up to twice the amount of actual damages arising out of a violation of Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act if the violation demonstrated wanton disregard for the rights of that person. * * * If you have comments on the foregoing, please provide them to the undersigned. Mary K. Bellamy Associate General Counsel Attachments

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