October 11, 2012
International Organization of Securities Commissions
c/o Teresa Rodriguez Arias
Calle Oquendo 12
28006 Madrid, Spain
Re: Public Comment on Technological Challenges to Effective Market Surveillance
Dear Sir or Madam:
The Investment Company Institute (“ICI”) and ICI Global support the International
Organization of Securities Commissions’ (“IOSCO”) review of challenges posed by technological
developments to effective market surveillance. The consultation report (“Consultation”) issued by
IOSCO raises a number of issues of importance to ICI and ICI Global members.1
ICI is the national association of U.S. investment companies, including mutual funds, closed-
end funds, exchange-traded funds (“ETFs”), and unit investment trusts (“UITs”).2 The structure of the
global financial markets has a significant impact on ICI members, who are investors of over $13 trillion
of assets on behalf of over 90 million individual shareholders.3
ICI Global is a global fund trade organization based in London; members include regulated
U.S. and non-U.S. based funds publicly offered to investors in jurisdictions worldwide. ICI Global
seeks to advance the common interests and to promote public understanding of global investment
1 Technological Challenges to Effective Market Surveillance, Issues and Regulatory Tools, International Organization of
Securities Commissions (August 2012). The Consultation can be found on IOSCO’s website at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD389.pdf.
2 ICI seeks to encourage adherence to high ethical standards, promote public understanding, and otherwise advance the
interests of funds, their shareholders, directors, and advisers.
3 For more information on the U.S. registered investment company industry, see 2012 Investment Company Institute Fact
Book at www.icifactbook.org.
International Organization of Securities Commissions
October 11, 2012
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funds, their managers, and investors. Members of ICI Global manage total assets of over $1 trillion in
assets worldwide.
ICI and ICI Global members, and their shareholders, have a strong interest in ensuring that the
regulatory structure that governs the financial markets allows for the most effective system of market
surveillance possible. Consistent with this goal, we have strongly supported the examination of issues
related to technology and market surveillance as well as other issues that may impact the fair and orderly
operation of the global financial markets and investor confidence in those markets. Our comments on
the Consultation reiterate many of the comments made in prior ICI and ICI Global letters on other
proposals and consultations related to technology and market surveillance.4
I. General Comments
The structure of the global financial markets has undergone significant changes over the past
several years. Clearly, a primary driver and enabler of these changes has been the continual evolution of
technologies for generating, routing and executing orders and related improvements to the speed,
capacity and sophistication of the trading functions available to investors.
ICI and ICI Global have spent a significant amount of time examining the impact of
technology on the financial markets and on investors. The proliferation of technology has forced funds
and other institutional investors to modify their trading strategies. When determining the most
efficient approach to executing a trade, funds must now take into account: (1) the impact of the
increase in volume of trading attributed to certain market participants such as high frequency traders
and the significant amount of electronic trading in general; (2) fragmentation in the markets and the
number and types of alternative trading venues available; and (3) the new technology and tools available
to funds when trading.
We are therefore pleased that IOSCO has determined to take a comprehensive look at the
surveillance capabilities of Market Authorities5 in overseeing the markets. We strongly support the
goals of the Consultation – to improve surveillance capabilities on a cross-market and cross-asset basis
and to make more useful to Market Authorities the data collected for surveillance purposes. In
4 ICI previously provided comments on IOSCO’s consultation on issues raised by the impact of technological changes on
market integrity and efficiency. See Letter from Karrie McMillan, General Counsel, Investment Company Institute, to
Werner Bijkerk, Senior Policy Advisor, IOSCO, dated August 12, 2011; available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/25408.pdf.
We also provided comments on other IOSCO consultations related to trading and market structure issues such as dark
liquidity, direct electronic access, and the regulation of short selling. For a comprehensive list of, and links to, ICI and ICI
Global comment letters and statements on trading and market structure issues, see Appendix.
5 The Consultation defines “Market Authority” as a “Statutory Regulator” (i.e., supervisors of securities trading venues that
are established by statute), an SRO or the operator of a trading venue, which is responsible for conducting and/or overseeing
market surveillance efforts.
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October 11, 2012
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considering the recommendations in the Consultation, however, we urge Market Authorities to take a
measured approach. If regulations are too restrictive, they may unintentionally limit the use of evolving
practices and technological developments, impeding funds’ use of new and innovative trading tools. In
addition, if regulations are too onerous or costly for some market participants, those participants may
decide not to offer certain products or services to investors, or the cost of trading may increase as
market participants shift the burden of compliance with new requirements to investors. We therefore
urge Market Authorities to carefully balance these potential costs with the benefits any new or
amended regulations would provide to investors.
II. Proposed Recommendations
It is clear that regulations governing the financial markets have not kept pace with the
significant changes in trading practices. This includes regulations on market abuse and disorderly
trading related to technology, particularly computer generated orders. We believe the Consultation’s
proposed recommendations are therefore timely and necessary to assist Market Authorities, at a
minimum, in establishing a framework for reviewing and amending their current market surveillance
practices.
A. Regulatory Capabilities
We strongly agree with the Consultation’s proposed recommendation that Market Authorities
should have the organizational and technical capabilities to monitor effectively the trading venues they
supervise, including the ability to identify market abuse and trading that may impact the fairness and
orderliness of trading venues. As the Consultation notes, the absence in many jurisdictions of certain
market surveillance tools is potentially one of the most significant problems facing the markets in light
of recent technological developments.
1. What regulatory capabilities are, in general, needed in order for Market Authorities to
survey for and detect market abuse that occurs on a cross-asset and cross-market basis?
How can such abuse be best detected and combated?
As the Consultation recognizes, the resources available to Market Authorities will determine, in
part, the degree to which they can develop the capabilities to conduct effective surveillance. Ensuring
that Market Authorities have adequate resources to survey for and detect market abuse is critical to an
overall market surveillance regime.
Resources alone, however, will be ineffective if Market Authorities do not have a strong
understanding of how the markets currently operate. ICI and ICI Global therefore believe that Market
Authorities must focus on ensuring that staff understand the methods by which trading occurs on their
markets and the various types of market participants involved in trading. Given the complexity of the
International Organization of Securities Commissions
October 11, 2012
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markets, a thorough understanding of how markets operate is essential to survey for and detect market
abuse.
Finally, as discussed further below, we believe there is a need for cooperation among Market
Authorities across jurisdictions, and also among Market Authorities in the same jurisdiction but across
different markets or asset classes, to effectively survey for and detect market abuse.
2. Do you think existing systems (e.g., audit trail systems) in your jurisdiction monitor
effectively electronic trading (both cross-market and cross-asset), i.e., are they able to
ensure the fair and orderly functioning of Trading Venues and to promote market
integrity? Please explain and describe any enhancements that you believe are necessary.
Are the necessary resources for effective systems available?
A robust transaction reporting regime is necessary to enable Market Authorities to monitor the
activities of market participants, to ensure compliance with regulations, and to monitor for market
abuses. In the United States, ICI supported the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”)
recently adopted rule to develop, implement, and maintain a consolidated audit trail (“CAT”).6
Specifically, the new rule will require U.S. exchanges to jointly submit a comprehensive plan detailing
how they would create, implement, and maintain a consolidated audit trail that must collect and
accurately identify every order, cancellation, modification, and trade execution for all exchange-listed
equities and equity options across all U.S. markets. We strongly support an examination by other
Market Authorities of similar audit trail regimes.
3. To be able to perform effectively market surveillance, to what extent should Market
Authorities have the ability to reconstruct and analyze order books? Why or why not?
We strongly believe that Market Authorities should have the ability to reconstruct and analyze
order books. This need was illustrated after the flash crash in the United States, when it was extremely
difficult and time consuming for the SEC to analyze the events that took place. We are encouraged by
efforts of some regulators to devote resources towards improving their ability to examine order books.
For example, the SEC recently announced that it is working with outside vendors to implement
computer programs that will provide the SEC with the tools necessary to more readily detect trading
that may be abusive or manipulative and to more quickly reconstruct a market infrastructure
disruption. In addition, the SEC’s CAT, as discussed above, should assist in the examination of order
books and overall trading. We believe Market Authorities should devote increased resources towards
such efforts, as outdated technology can limit the ability to examine market disruption events and
oversee the markets in general.
6 See Letter from Karrie McMillan, General Counsel, Investment Company Institute, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary,
Securities and Exchange Commission, dated August 9, 2010; available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/24477.pdf.
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October 11, 2012
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B. Review of Surveillance Capabilities
ICI and ICI Global strongly believe that Market Authorities should review their surveillance
capabilities as a regular part of any surveillance regime. Such a review is important to determine
whether the necessary resources have been allocated to keep pace with the rapid technological
advancements in trading.
4. Do you think that developments in technology have impacted Market Authorities’ ability
to monitor markets? If so, how?
There is no doubt that rapid developments in technology have impacted Market Authorities’
ability to monitor the financial markets. Most significantly, the use of automated trading and high
frequency trading has significantly increased over just the past several years. As noted above, we believe
that regulations governing the financial markets have not kept pace with the proliferation of electronic
trading and the significant changes in market participants’ trading practices.
We are concerned that recent technological advances in trading have allowed practices that
should be considered as improper or manipulative to be employed more easily and cheaply, thereby
lowering the risk to users of these practices. This, in turn, has made trading more challenging for funds
that are interested in buying and selling large positions and that can be disadvantaged by market
participants that trade in front of their orders.7
5. Are there specific developments that have impacted this ability more than others? If so,
which ones?
We believe it is difficult to point to one or more specific developments that may have impacted
the ability of Market Authorities to monitor the markets as technological developments in trading that
have taken place cannot be viewed in a vacuum. Many technological developments are closely linked
and must be considered together as market surveillance issues are examined.
7 See, e.g., Letter from Karrie McMillan, General Counsel, Investment Company Institute, to Werner Bijkerk, Senior Policy
Advisor, IOSCO, dated August 12, 2011 (IOSCO Consultation on Issues Raised by the Impact of Technological Changes
on Market Integrity and Efficiency); available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/25408.pdf.
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October 11, 2012
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6. To what extent have you identified instances of market abuse or possible market abuse,
including inappropriate activity that could (or has) lead to disorderly markets, which you
feel is directly related to the misuse of automated trading technology? Please provide
details. For example: Do you believe your jurisdiction has experienced market
infrastructure disruptions caused by automated trading, including HFT/algorithm use,
that have caused network traffic or processing to exceed the capacity of Trading Venues,
key market information providers or large market participants? If so, please describe.
There have been a number of recent instances of market infrastructure disruptions in the
financial markets that have been related in one way or another to the use of technology in trading. ICI
and ICI Global therefore have supported the establishment of robust pre- and post-trade risk controls
to prevent systems from generating and sending orders to the market that may be erroneous or not
compliant with applicable regulatory requirements.
One issue that we believe should be examined by Market Authorities is the increasing number
of order cancellations in the markets, particularly those that are cancelled shortly after submission.
Orders sent to the market with no intention of being executed can strain a market’s technological
infrastructure, and under the right circumstances, could interrupt the ability to process trades in an
orderly fashion. ICI and ICI Global members also report that certain of the practices and strategies
surrounding cancellations often are designed to detect fund trading of large blocks of securities and to
trade with or ahead of those blocks to the detriment of investors.8
Similarly, exchanges and other trading venues continue to create various types of orders to cater
to market participants who create automated trading strategies and desire a vehicle through which to
implement those strategies. Many of these order types facilitate strategies that can lead to disorderly
markets or that can benefit market participants at the expense of long-term investors. We therefore
recommend that Market Authorities vigorously examine the specific order types that exchanges and
other trading venues offer and any market surveillance issues raised by the use of these order types.
7. Have there been any developments other than technology that have impacted Market
Authorities’ ability to monitor the markets? Please provide details.
While arguably related to technology, we believe that the fragmentation of the financial
markets and the submission of large numbers of orders and trades across multiple venues have
contributed to the difficulties for Market Authorities to effectively monitor the markets.
8 We have recommended on several occasions that regulators examine whether a fee should be imposed on cancelled orders
above a certain ratio of orders to executed transactions, designed to discourage the current risk free use of certain types of
orders and to protect the integrity of the markets’ infrastructure. We urge Market Authorities and market participants to
address concerns regarding cancelled orders and to consider truly meaningful fees or other deterrents that could adequately
address this behavior.
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October 11, 2012
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C. Access to Data
ICI and ICI Global agree with the Consultation that the ability to access the data necessary to
oversee a market is integral to an effective surveillance system. We therefore support the Consultation’s
proposed recommendation that within a jurisdiction, the relevant Market Authorities should
individually or collectively have the capability to access data in a way that enables them to conduct
effective surveillance.
8. To what extent do you think that a Central Reporting Point is necessary within a domestic
market in order to conduct surveillance effectively, particularly across markets and/or
assets? In other words, to what extent would the development of audit trail systems that
are able to consolidate pre- and post-trade data across Trading Venues within a domestic
market be beneficial? Please explain your answer.
a. To the degree that you advocate a Central Reporting Point, what kind of data would
be needed for your respective surveillance tasks, e.g., order data/transactions data,
both? What are the impediments to introducing these systems? What are the benefits?
b. What are the potential costs associated with the establishment of a Central Reporting
Point?
As discussed above, ICI supported the SEC’s recently adopted rule to create a CAT that will
collect and accurately identify every order, cancellation, modification, and trade execution for all
exchange-listed equities and equity options across all U.S. markets. We agree with arguments made by
some Market Authorities that a “Central Reporting Point” (“CRP”), such as the one that would be
facilitated by a CAT, could assist Market Authorities in their ability to detect the use of manipulative
or deceptive practices in the markets as well as perform market reconstructions in a timely manner. We
also agree that the information provided by a CRP could help assess the impact of technological
developments on the quality of the markets, such as the impact of automated trading and high
frequency trading. We therefore believe a CRP could prove beneficial to the markets overall.
We are cognizant, however, about the potential costs related to developing and operating a
CRP. We therefore believe that as Market Authorities consider the development of any audit trail
system, they consider costs as one of the factors in determining the type and scope of such a system.
9. Are there alternatives to a Central Reporting Point that can achieve the same end? Please
explain.
Given concerns relating to the costs associated with a CRP, we are open to alternatives that
would achieve the same results.
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October 11, 2012
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D. Customer Identification
10. To what extent should market surveillance systems or audit trails require the provision of
customer identifiers? What are the impediments to providing customer identifiers in
audit trail data?
In general, we believe that Market Authorities should have the capability to associate a
customer and market participant with each order and transaction; a market surveillance system or audit
trail would ultimately benefit if a customer can be identified. Along these lines, ICI has supported the
development of a global legal entity identifier (“LEI”) for the financial markets to aid regulators and
market participants in measuring and monitoring systemic risk.9
As discussed further below, however, the confidentiality of the customer identification must be
ensured and any customer identification system must contain appropriate confidential safeguards to
protect surveillance data that is reported to the system.
E. Format
We support efforts by Market Authorities to ensure that data required for market surveillance
be reported to them for use and storage in a usable format. We believe data reported in such a manner
would facilitate the use and comparison of data by Market Authorities in an efficient and effective
manner.
11. What regulatory steps, if any, should Market Authorities take in order to help ensure that
any data reported to them for use and storage is in a usable format?
ICI and ICI Global do not have a specific view on this question at this time.
12. To what extent are you concerned about the ability of Market Authorities to reconstruct
and analyze order book(s) in the correct sequence? What tools are necessary to do so?
As discussed above, we believe the ability of Market Authorities to reconstruct and analyze
order books is significant given the number of recent market infrastructure disruptions. Providing
Market Authorities with the tools to conduct such activities will be critical given the speed at which
trades occur, the complexity of trading, and the fragmentation of the markets. We believe the proposed
recommendations in the Consultation will go far in facilitating the ability for Market Authorities to
effectively examine order books.
9 See, e.g., Letter from Trade Associations to IOSCO and Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, dated September
23, 2011 (supporting IOSCO-CPSS position that a system of LEIs would be an essential tool for the aggregation of OTC
derivatives data).
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F. Data Protection
We believe that data protection is one of the most significant aspects of any market surveillance
system. We therefore strongly agree with the Consultation’s proposed recommendation that Market
Authorities establish and maintain appropriate confidential safeguards to protect surveillance data that
is reported to them.
As ICI has stated in several letters to the SEC, the confidentiality of information regarding
fund trades is of significant importance to funds. Any premature or improper disclosure of this
information can lead to frontrunning of a fund’s trades, adversely impacting the price of the stock that
the fund is buying or selling.
13. To what extent are current confidentiality provisions sufficient? If not, how can they be
strengthened?
We understand that many Market Authorities have confidentiality provisions incorporated
into their regulatory market surveillance regimes. We believe that all such provisions should, at a
minimum, ensure that data provided to Market Authorities for the performance of their surveillance
functions is secure, used only for regulatory purposes, and cannot be viewed or amended by
unauthorized parties.
14. To what extent should Market Authorities be able to obtain surveillance data from other
Market Authorities, whether inside or outside their jurisdiction, relating to securities
trading, including the identity of customers? What issues are raised? Please explain your
answer.
We agree that in the context of compliance, investigations and enforcement, Market
Authorities may need to share information with other Market Authorities. When this takes place, all
involved Market Authorities must take steps to ensure the appropriate confidentiality agreements are in
place.
G. Synchronization of Business Clocks
15. To what extent do you think there would be value in requiring Trading Venues and
market participants to attach a synchronized time-stamp to their orders reflecting when
that order was sent?
We agree, in general, with the policies surrounding the proposed recommendation that Market
Authorities should consider requiring trading venues and their participants within their jurisdiction to
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October 11, 2012
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synchronize the business clocks they use to record the date and time of any reportable event.
Specifically, we believe synchronizing time stamps could facilitate the accuracy of trade data and assist
Market Authorities in surveillance overall.
We are cognizant, however, of the difficulties of requiring all market participants to accurately
synchronize time stamps, particularly in jurisdictions with fragmented markets, multiple trading
venues, and numerous market participants, and of the confusion that may occur if such time stamps are
inaccurate by the most minimal of measures. We therefore believe that there is a need for Market
Authorities to further examine the feasibility of synchronized time stamps prior to requiring trading
venues and market participants to attach such time stamps to their orders.
H. Cross-Border Surveillance Capabilities
Given the proliferation of cross-border trading, the cooperation of Market Authorities in
different jurisdictions has become critical to an effective market surveillance system.
16. What steps, if any, should Market Authorities take to facilitate cross-border surveillance?
Are the current processes sufficient?
17. What regulatory capabilities are, in general, needed in order for Market Authorities to
survey for and detect market abuse that occurs on a cross-border basis? How can such
abuse be best detected and combated?
We agree with the Consultation that, at a minimum, Market Authorities should work
collectively and take appropriate steps to strengthen their cross-border surveillance capabilities.
Jurisdictions around the world are addressing the market surveillance issues discussed in the
Consultation, and we believe it is therefore desirable to achieve a broad consistency of approach to
issues surrounding market surveillance across different jurisdictions given the links between the
financial markets.
* * * * *
International Organization of Securities Commissions
October 11, 2012
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We offer our assistance as the issues under the Consultation continue to be examined. If you
have any questions on our comments, please feel free to contact the undersigned, or Ari Burstein at 1-
202-371-5408 or aburstein@ici.org.
Sincerely,
/s/ Karrie McMillan /s/ Dan Waters
Karrie McMillan Dan Waters
General Counsel Managing Director
Investment Company Institute ICI Global
1-202-326-5815 44-203-009-3101
kmcmillan@ici.org dan.waters@ici.org
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APPENDIX
KEY ICI AND ICI GLOBAL COMMENT LETTERS AND STATEMENTS ON MARKET STRUCTURE ISSUES
Order Execution Obligations: Letter from Craig S. Tyle, Senior Counsel, Investment Company
Institute, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, dated January 16,
1996; available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/7561.pdf
Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: Letter from Craig S. Tyle, General Counsel,
Investment Company Institute, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission,
dated July 28, 1998; available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/comment98_reg_exch_ats.pdf
Market Fragmentation Concept Release: Letter from Craig S. Tyle, General Counsel, Investment
Company Institute, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, dated May
12, 2000; available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/11894.pdf
Subpenny Concept Release: Letter from Craig S. Tyle, General Counsel, Investment Company
Institute, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, dated November 20,
2001; available at http://www.ici.org/policy/comments/01_SEC_SUBPENNY_COM
Regulation NMS: Letter from Ari Burstein, Associate Counsel, Investment Company Institute, to
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, dated June 30, 2004; available at
http://www.ici.org/policy/markets/domestic/04_sec_nms_com
Disclosure of Short Sales and Short Positions: Letter from Ari Burstein, Senior Counsel, Investment
Company Institute, to Florence Harmon, Acting Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission,
dated December 16, 2008; available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/23128.pdf
IOSCO Consultation on Regulation of Short Selling: Letter from Ari Burstein, Senior Counsel,
Investment Company Institute, to Greg Tanzer, Secretary General, IOSCO, dated May 18, 2009;
available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/comment_051809_iosco_consult.pdf
IOSCO Consultation on Direct Electronic Access: Letter from Ari Burstein, Senior Counsel,
Investment Company Institute, to Greg Tanzer, Secretary General, IOSCO, dated May 20, 2009;
available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/23474.pdf
Amendments to Regulation SHO (Short Selling): Letter from Karrie McMillan, General Counsel,
Investment Company Institute, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and Exchange
Commission, dated June 19, 2009; available at
http://www.ici.org/policy/comments/cov_comment/09_sec_short_sale_com
U.S. Senate Market Structure Hearing: Statement of the Investment Company Institute, Hearing on
“Dark Pools, Flash Orders, High Frequency Trading, and Other Market Structure Issues,” Securities,
Insurance, and Investment Subcommittee, Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, U.S.
Senate, October 28, 2009; available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/23925.pdf
A-2
Flash Orders: Letter from Karrie McMillan, General Counsel, Investment Company Institute, to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, dated November 23, 2009;
available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/23973.pdf
Non-Public Trading Interest: Letter from Karrie McMillan, General Counsel, Investment Company
Institute, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, dated February 22,
2010; available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/24142.pdf
Market Access: Letter from Ari Burstein, Senior Counsel, Investment Company Institute, to Elizabeth
M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, dated March 29, 2010; available at
http://www.ici.org/pdf/24210.pdf
SEC Concept Release on Equity Market Structure: Letter from Karrie McMillan, General Counsel,
Investment Company Institute, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and Exchange
Commission, dated April 21, 2010; available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/24266.pdf
SEC Market Structure Roundtables: Letters from Karrie McMillan, General Counsel, Investment
Company Institute, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, dated
June 1, 2010 and June 23, 2010; available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/24361.pdf and
http://www.ici.org/pdf/24384.pdf
Circuit Breakers: Letters from Karrie McMillan, General Counsel, Investment Company Institute, to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, dated June 3, 2010 and July 19,
2010; available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/24364.pdf and http://www.ici.org/pdf/24438.pdf
Large Trader Reporting System: Letter from Karrie McMillan, General Counsel, Investment Company
Institute, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, dated June 22,
2010; available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/24381.pdf
Clearly Erroneous Executions: Letter from Karrie McMillan, General Counsel, Investment Company
Institute, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, dated July 19,
2010; available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/24437.pdf
Consolidated Audit Trail: Letter from Karrie McMillan, General Counsel, Investment Company
Institute, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, dated August 9,
2010; available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/24477.pdf
European Commission Review of MiFID: Letter from Karrie McMillan, General Counsel, Investment
Company Institute, to Directorate General, European Commission, dated February 2, 2011; available
at http://www.ici.org/pdf/24946.pdf
IOSCO Consultation on Dark Liquidity: Letter from Karrie McMillan, General Counsel, Investment
Company Institute, to Werner Bijkerk, Senior Policy Advisor, IOSCO, dated February 11, 2011;
available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/24968.pdf
A-3
Limit Up-Limit Down System: Letter from Karrie McMillan, General Counsel, Investment Company
Institute, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, dated June 22,
2011; available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/25295.pdf
Dodd-Frank Act Short Sale Reporting Study: Letter from Karrie McMillan, General Counsel,
Investment Company Institute, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and Exchange
Commission, dated June 23, 2011; available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/25297.pdf
IOSCO Consultation on Issues Raised by the Impact of Technological Changes on Market Integrity
and Efficiency: Letter from Karrie McMillan, General Counsel, Investment Company Institute, to
Werner Bijkerk, Senior Policy Advisor, IOSCO, dated August 12, 2011; available at
http://www.ici.org/pdf/25408.pdf
Regulatory Action on Short Selling in the European Union: Letter from Karrie McMillan, General
Counsel, Investment Company Institute, to Steven Maijoor, Chair, European Securities and Markets
Authority, dated August 17, 2011; available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/25428.pdf
ESMA Consultation on Guidelines on Systems and Controls in a Highly Automated Trading
Environment: Letter from Karrie McMillan, General Counsel, Investment Company Institute, to
Steven Maijoor, Chair, European Securities and Markets Authority, dated October 3, 2011; available at
http://www.ici.org/pdf/25546.pdf
NASDAQ Market Quality Program: Letter from Ari Burstein, Senior Counsel, Investment Company
Institute, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, dated May 3,
2012; available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/26142.pdf
NYSE Arca Fixed Incentive Program: Letter from Ari Burstein, Senior Counsel, Investment Company
Institute, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, dated June 7,
2012; available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/26227.pdf
U.S. House of Representatives Market Structure Hearing: Testimony of Kevin Cronin, Global Head
of Equity Trading, Invesco, on Behalf of the Investment Company Institute, Hearing on “Market
Structure: Ensuring Orderly, Efficient, Innovative and Competitive Markets for Issuers and Investors,”
Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises, Committee on Financial
Services, U.S. House of Representatives, June 20, 2012; available at
http://www.ici.org/pdf/12_house_cap_mkts.pdf
NASDAQ and NYSE Arca Market Maker Incentive Programs: Letter from Ari Burstein, Senior
Counsel, Investment Company Institute, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and Exchange
Commission, dated August 16, 2012; available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/26400.pdf
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